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Abstract. Securing automated teller machines (ATMs), as critical and
complex infrastructure, requires a precise understanding of the associated
threats. This paper reports on the application of attack-defense trees to
model and analyze the security of ATMs. We capture the most dangerous
multi-stage attack scenarios applicable to ATM structures, and establish
a practical experience report, where we reflect on the process of modeling
ATM threats via attack-defense trees. In particular, we share our insights
into the benefits and drawbacks of attack-defense tree modeling, as well
as best practices and lessons learned.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide, the compromise of automated teller machines (ATMs) is a very lu-
crative criminal business. One of the prime reasons is the monetary incentive,
allowing successful attackers to take money instantly. Moreover, their geograph-
ical spread, dependence on human interactions, and integration of local and
external networks make ATMs a very accessible target for exploitation, vulnera-
ble to a large variety of attack scenarios. Thus, criminals constantly invent new
ways to circumvent protections and compromise the machines. The European
ATM Crime Report (EAST)2 evaluates the loss in 2015 due to ATM Related
Fraud Attacks in Europe was around 300 millions Euro.
The security of individual ATMs concerns both banks and the organiza-
tions hosting the machines. In this context, security risk management, being a
critical activity for any enterprise, becomes essential. To support risk analysts,
many methodologies have been developed. These include security methods, such
as NIST SP800-30 and STRIDE [19], standards for the risk management pro-
cess (e.g. ISO/IEC 27005), and modeling techniques and formalisms (for exam-
ple, misuse cases [13], anti-goal refinement [10], and attack trees [18]). These
?
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methodologies aim at providing structure to the risk assessment process, facil-
itating interactions among stakeholders, and cataloguing the identified threats.
Furthermore, some of these techniques enable advanced quantitative risk analysis
with security metrics, e.g. expected time of attack or worst case impact.
In this paper, we report on the application of attack-defense trees to security
risk assessment of ATMs. Attack-defense trees (ADTrees, [8]) extend the popular
attack trees formalism with defenses (also called countermeasures). Similarly to
attack trees, ADTrees enjoy an appealing and intuitive visual representation, a
structured way to brainstorm about attack scenarios [9] and formal frameworks
to analyze the trees qualitatively or quantitatively [11, 8]. Additionally, ADTrees
support reasoning about potential defenses, enabling highly effective decision-
making processes for countermeasure selection. Since defenses are crucial in the
case of ATMs, the ADTrees formalism provided valuable support for our case.
Our paper presents a practical experience report, where we reflect on the
process of modeling ATM security threats, and potential countermeasures via
ADTrees. The paper outlines the case study, and describes our process for de-
signing a large, comprehensive ADTree. We also share techniques that we found
useful when working with ADTrees and report caveats that the practitioners
need to become aware of.
2 Background and preliminaries
Attack trees. Attack trees (ATrees, [18, 11]) are a graphical formalism to struc-
ture, model and analyze the potential attacks on an asset. An attack tree starts
with a security threat, modelled as the root of the tree, representing the at-
tacker’s top level goal. This root is recursively refined into the attacker’s subgoals
through logical gates, modelling how successful attack steps propagate through
the system. AND-gates model that, to succeed in this step, the attacker must
succeed in all of its child nodes; OR-gates model that, to succeed in this step, the
attacker must succeed in at least one of its child nodes. When further refinement
is not possible or not required, one arrives at the basic attack steps (BASs),
sitting at the leaves of the ATree.
Attack-defense trees. Attack-defense trees extend attack trees with defensive
measures, also called countermeasures, yielding a graphical mathematical model
of multi-stage attacks along with safeguards [8]. Defense nodes can appear at any
level of the tree, and can be further refined with AND- and OR-gates. Moreover,
countermeasures can themselves be attacked. Thus, each node belongs either to
the attacker (represented as red ellipses in our figures) or defender (green squares
our figures). Countermeasures prevent an adversary from reaching the goal, thus
an ADTree represents an interplay between an attacker, whose goal is to attack
the system, and a defender who tries to protect it [8].
Related work. Several papers report on the applicability of attack trees in practi-
cal scenarios. Opdahl and Sindre have empirically compared ATrees with misuse
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cases and reported that participants were able to identify more threats with
ATrees [13]. Saini et al. evaluated security of the MyProxy system with ATrees
[17], Byres et al. used attack trees to evaluate the SCADA communication sys-
tems security [2], and Ray and Poolsapassit applied the ATree methodology to
identify insider threats [15]. Security of vehicular ad-hoc networks was evaluated
with ATrees in [3]. In [4, 5], Edge et al. modeled an online banking scenario
and homeland security via deriving protection trees from ATrees. Following the
approach of [7], a methodology to construct ATrees based on the system architec-
ture, risk assessment study outcomes and a security knowledge base is proposed
in [14]. This methodology follows a layered approach to generate skeletons of
attack trees. Morais et al. [12] follow a similar methodology but in a top-down
manner, when first high-level attacks are collated, and then these are refined into
concrete attack steps. None of these approaches, however, included defenses.
To the best of our knowledge, the ADTree formal language has been em-
pirically validated only once; through a case study on a warehouse goods man-
agement system developed by Bagnato et al. [1]. That work focused mainly on
the quantitative aspects of the ADTree methodology. In this article, instead, we
focus on modeling aspects of the ADTree methodology.
3 The ATM case study
Establishing the context. This case study considers an ATM located inside a
gas station, which is split in two main zones: the store zone, enabled with a
security glass door class RC3 and two security glass windows class RC23, and the
internal office, where the technological components related to the gas station
management (workstation, printer, router and local Internet connection used
to share information with the headquarters) are located. Customers can transit
the store zone to buy or request services, including ATM services, during the
business hours of the store. The gas station is open from 6:00 AM to midnight
and provides several services including: fuel, car-wash, food, cash, etc.
Identification of interested parties. The gas station involves different interested
parties that may perform several roles. Physical security is outsourced to a Secu-
rity Provider who has physical countermeasures implemented in the gas station.
These include a fire alarm, video surveillance enabled with four external cameras
(one of them hidden) and three internal cameras, and burglar alarm enabled with
several kinds of sensors (window/door vibration and movement detectors) and
anti-jamming features. Also, the Security Provider has 24x7 service and direct
connection with police and fire stations in case of any verified incident. Insurance
provider lets ATM owners insure their assets in case of any incident based on
several scenarios and configurations. The ATM per se is an asset and the invest-
ment in each unit can vary widely depending on the brand, model, configuration,
3 http://www.din.de/en/getting-involved/standards-committees/nabau/
projects/wdc-proj:din21:208343022
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etc. Bank is an organisation that manages a range of financial services, including
ATM transactions from its own ATMs or from other ATMs as issuer/acquirer.
Customers are users who use the gas station’s services, including the ATM. At-
tacker is an interested party responsible for exploiting a vulnerability with the
objective of achieving an illegal goal. Finally, Internal employee/intruder is an
internal employee who could potentially provide information or physical access
(voluntarily or not) to attackers.
4 The attack-defense tree model
Developing ATree models for complex systems has been traditionally a cumber-
some task requiring a team of experts. The first step towards modeling is to
understand the system by identifying stakeholders, the components that make
up the system, and the attackers. Another important aspect is to grasp the se-
mantics of the ADTree modelling language. We covered both aspects by building
a team of four security experts, two from industry and two from academia. One
industry expert from our team has experience in security and financial services;
he played the domain expert role. The second industry expert has expertise in
security assessment, financial services, and has prior experience with Atrees. She
played the role of validator and was responsible for quality evaluation. The other
team members have extensive knowledge of semantics and analysis techniques
for ADTrees. They were responsible for structuring the tree. In the rest of this
section we explain the process followed by our team to design a comprehensive
ADTree model for the ATM scenario. We used the open source ADTool software
for designing the tree [6].
Overcoming the lack of attack intelligence. The task of mapping a security sce-
nario into an ADtree greatly depends on the security expertise of the team
developing the tree. However, security expertise needs to be complemented with
data about previous attacks. Such data can come in the form of an attack pattern
library4, i.e. a structure containing precondition and postcondition of attacks,
attack profiles, and a glossary of defined terms and phrases. Yet, businesses and
governments are usually reluctant to disclose attack data, as it may harm their
reputation and could help attackers to exploit similar vulnerabilities.
For this case study, the financial services specialist overcame the lack of attack
data by using different sources of information on ATM security, such as PCI-
DSS ATM Security Guidelines5 to understand how secure channels for payment
systems based on smartcards are implemented, ATM Industry Association6 to
collect best practices in ATM security, EU law enforcement agency7 to get recent
4 www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/01tn001.pdf
5 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci_security/
6 https://www.atmia.com/
7 https://www.europol.europa.eu/
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Fig. 1. An excerpt of an ADTree on ATM crime: the revised taxonomy.
trends in cybercrime, National Crime Agency8 and ATM Marketplace9 to gather
recent reports on financial fraud and potential countermeasures.
Because it is convenient to structure the tree similarly to standard reports and
documentation already familiar to stakeholders, lawyers, and analysts in general,
we split the list of attacks and countermeasures resulting from the previously
mentioned study in categories that can be found in well-known incident reports
(e.g. the EAST report 201510 and the ATMIA Global Fraud Survey 201511).
This led to the taxonomy of attacks and countermeasures shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows two main types of ATM fraud: those requiring highly so-
phisticated software (e.g. malware or blackbox devices) and those which use
conventional electronic devices (e.g. card skimmers) and/or require the partic-
ipation of the victim (e.g. card trapping). The first category led to the notion
of logical attacks, which require installing malicious software on the ATM or
acquiring system credentials through cyber attacks. Malware could be deployed
in the ATM PC or a blackbox device connected with the ATM computer system
in order to gain access to cash or sensitive data. The second category includes
physical attacks, where a legitimate user’s account is involved, which we call
fraud, and also physical attacks jeopardizing the physical integrity of the ATM.
Figure 1 also depicts potential countermeasures. For example, card skimming
and cash trapping can be prevented by anti-skimming solutions such as stress
sensors, or by making compulsory the use of EMV technology (Chip&PIN) and
contactless cards. A general countermeasure against this type of fraud is to make
customers and employees aware of the fraud in order to perform quick physical
inspections themselves. Brute force attacks in contrast, cannot be actually pre-
8 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/
9 http://www.atmmarketplace.com/
10 https://www.european-atm-security.eu/tag/european-atm-crime-report/
11 https://www.atmia.com/whitepapers/global-fraud-survey-2015/1104/
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vented, but detected. Detection mechanisms are GPS-enabled devices to localize
the ATM, tilt, vibration, and gas sensors, etc.
Capturing attack vectors in a semantically meaningful way. The ADTree we
produced, an excerpt of which is shown in Figure 1, is a useful classification
of attacks to ATMs, and applicable countermeasures and mitigation strategies.
However, it does not benefit from the main feature of ADTrees as a mathematical
language, that is, the ability to encode several attack vectors in a compact tree
structure. An attack vector is a path or a set of attack steps an adversary can
follow in order to successfully attack a system. In ADTrees, attack vectors are
expressed by using the conjunctive operator AND, which expresses that all sub-
goals of a given goal ought to be achieved.
The main challenge when modeling many attack vectors in an ADTree is to
guarantee that it is semantically meaningful, while keeping its communication
potential. The team addressed this challenge by frequently executing two differ-
ent verification processes. The first one consisted in checking that the taxonomy
depicted in Figure 1 is preserved as much as possible. The second one consisted
in keeping track of those attack vectors we expected to model, and verifying
that the multiset semantics of ADTrees [8] matches this set of attack vectors.
The whole process took 6 days of work, involving all four team members. Each
modification to the tree was cross-checked by at least two team members, taking
into account the two verification processes explained before. Next we detail one
sub-branch of the full ADTree (see Figure 2).
Blackbox attack. An interesting logical attack to ATMs consists in embedding a
blackbox device into the ATM and connecting it to the ATM’s computer system
(see Figure 2). This can only be done by accessing the ATM’s internal infras-
tructure without being detected, implying that the adversary needs to get into
the facility where the ATM is located. A classical way to enter into a facility
is by breaking in, e.g. through a window or a door, but the adversary could
also try to social engineer an employee. As contemplated in the ADTree, a bur-
glar alarm can deter or prevent a break in. Consequently, the adversary ought
to disable the burglar alarm by, for example, using a radio network inhibitor
against the used communication signal or protocol, e.g. Radio Frequency (RF)
and General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), respectively. In this particular case,
the defender can use anti-jamming techniques or a security guard to counteract
the adversary’s goal of disabling the alarm.
The use of video surveillance and burglar alarms for gas stations, required by
law in many countries, can dissuade the attacker from approaching the ATM in
order to install the blackbox device. However, there exist several techniques to
disable a burglar alarm, e.g. RF/GPRS inhibitors, and video surveillance system,
e.g. infrared light, laser, or video looping. From the defender point of view,
making the camera less visible and accessible, or performing regular physical
inspections, improve robustness of the video surveillance system.
Remark that owning a functional blackbox device means that the ATM
drivers have been disclosed or stolen. Moreover, even if the adversary man-
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Fig. 2. A sub-branch of the ADTree modelling the use of blackbox devices.
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ages to approach the ATM, he/she still needs to insert the blackbox device into
the ATM. That is to say, the adversary must open the ATM and connect the
blackbox to either the dispenser or the ATM’s internal communication system.
Opening the ATM in our case requires getting the cabinet physical key, or social
engineering the maintenance staff, or simply sabotaging the lock. As usual, the
success of social engineering attacks diminishes with regular training and moni-
toring, while the lock sabotage can be prevented with an ATM door sensor. To
finalize the description of the ADTree depicted in Figure 2, we remark that po-
tential countermeasures against blackbox devices are: encrypting the messages
exchanged between different components and devices, and a dedicated sensor
that detects when a data cable has been disconnected.
It is worth mentioning that the ADTree in Figure 2 covers 900 attack vectors,
called bundles in the multiset semantics in [8]. This emphasizes the modelling
power of ADTrees.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The ATM case study has enabled us to explore the application of ADTrees
in a challenging environment, with multiple stakeholders and a diverse range of
threats. Through this process, we have evaluated positive and negative aspects of
working with ADTrees, identified some best practices that improved the process,
and learned a number of lessons regarding the application of the formalism. We
share our findings in this section.
The intuitive graphical nature of ADTrees enables them to bridge the gap
between stakeholders from diverse backgrounds, providing an environment to
brainstorm, amend, document and analyze a wide range of threats. In partic-
ular, ADTrees provide a succinct and meaningful structure for a huge number
of potential attack vectors. This strength was already prominent when Schneier
introduced the attack tree back in 1999 [18], and our own experience reinforces
this observation. However, attack trees are constructed from the attacker’s per-
spective. Organizations are more focused on the overall risk (in terms of worst
case impact) and the inventory of effective treatment options to be implemented
to mitigate those risks. This is where ADTrees are more useful than attack trees.
We started to create the ADTree from a taxonomy of attacks on an ATM,
which proved to be very helpful. Using the established attack taxonomy allowed
us to structure the reasoning and compare the attacks we identified with the
globally known attacks, thus serving as a reference to check the tree for com-
pleteness.
In general, we found several countermeasures that did not really prevent
the attack, but triggered actions that could mitigate the impact of the attack.
Handling these countermeasures required lengthy team discussions. We suspect
that these challenges in handling treatment options arise from the fact that
they are not clearly addressed in the ADTree methodology itself (e.g. any of the
established semantics). One possibility is to extend the ADTree methodology by
explicitly typing defense nodes, following the example of attack-countermeasure
8
trees that support detective and reactive countermeasures [16]. However, this
change will also increase the cognitive load on the analysts.
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